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When a displaced person seeks residency in a country, the state must assess the person’s legal 
right to asylum, but this right is effectively qualified in various ways and this essay examines 
the effects of security and reparations as supplementary considerations shaping decisions 
about residency. As frameworks for responding to the needs of displaced persons, security 
and reparations were each urged by many NGOs about twenty years ago. Security has 
received more attention but this essay suggests that reparations may be a more effective way 
to respond given the historical and geopolitical causes of the mass displacement of peoples. 
International law and the wisdom of international agencies are valuable guides for 
addressing the refugee crisis currently shaming societies around the Mediterranean. And yet 
in some ways the very notion of a refugee crisis in the context of a discourse of security 
(Kerwin 2005) undercuts some of what we can learn from the best international practice. The 
notion of crisis focuses attention on a short-term and intense problem that manifests at certain 
geopolitical choke points. This risks detaching the event from its historical, geopolitical and 
political-economic setting, yet these connections have become central concerns of 
multilateral agencies addressing racism and neocolonialism. Historical harms and their 
continuing consequences might suggest claims that disadvantaged people could make upon 
those with advantages that rest upon those harms. In the main, reparations have been thought 
of as financial but one could consider other benefits such as the opportunity of immigration, 
adding further weight to certain categories of claims for asylum. 
A lack of historical and geographical perspective also be-devils the use of the term 
‘refugee’ (Malkki 1996) which, and again in the context of a security discourse, too easily 
evokes the paranoia of the Global War on Terror. There are a number of ways to address this 
and one that has been developing in both Africa (Edwards 2006) and South America 
(Arboleda 1991) has been to broaden the definition of ‘refugee’ beyond those displaced by 
military conflict to those fleeing civil unrest or environmental disaster (for further extensions 
of international human rights, see the chapter by Estrada-Tankck below). Considerations of 
torture have added gang violence (Wilkinson 2010) and domestic violence (Anker, Gilbert 
and Kelly 1997), or the violence of homophobia (Spijkerboer 2013) and female genital 
mutilation (Balser Moussette 1996) as practices that make life unlivable for some groups and 
provide good grounds for asylum claims. It might be fruitful to think of a very broad category 
of displaced persons and ask how to give them a haven that is not wickedly constrained by 
policies of containment and segregation that vilify those they claim to protect. These claims 
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have a particular purchase upon the people of Ireland and upon the state that acts in their 
name. 
 
Displaced persons and refugees 
 
Framing the question of the treatment of refugees in the context of security imperils the 
empathy upon which a humane treatment of vulnerable people must rely. There may even be 
risks in drawing too sharp a distinction between refugees and other migrants. The UN 
General Secretary took refugees and migrants together in a keynote pronouncement on 
population movement, In Safety and Diginity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and 
Migrants. The report noted that ‘most countries are simultaneously […] countries of origin, 
transit and destination for international migrants’ (Ki-moon 2016: 5). This is certainly true 
for Ireland (Gilmartin 2015). Over the period 2011-17, 482,600 people moved to live in 
Ireland, while 520,900 left (Central Statistics Office 2017, see figure 3.1).1 The non-Irish-
born immigrants who came to Ireland (316,000) are almost in balance with the Irish-born 
emigrants who went abroad to live (295,400). Many foreign-born people who come to live in 
Ireland, subsequently leave again. In the period 2011-17, this was the case for 225,500 
individuals, equivalent to seven-tenths of the sum of non-Irish-born arriving. The Irish 
themselves continue to be a relatively mobile people and during the period 2011-17 295,000 
Irish-born people left the country, whereas 167,000 Irish-born people returned from a time 
abroad. This flux ought perhaps to provoke empathy, with people in Ireland keen to treat 
visitors as they or their friends and family would wish to be treated should they, as they likely 





Figure 3.1 Immigration to and Emigration (shaded) from Ireland (thousands) by place of 
birth, 2011-17. Source: CSO, 2017 
 
In fact, Irish people have a relatively positive attitude towards immigration 
(Eurobarometer 2018; see figure 3.2).2 Across eight surveys 2014-18, 54.8% of the Irish 
respondents in face-to-face interviews said that they felt very positive or fairly positive in 
response to the statement, ‘Immigration from outside the EU’. After the level for Sweden 
(65.6%), this was the second highest among the twenty-nine countries of the EU. There is a 
high profile campaign of advertisements against racism, which, in 2017, put 1,500 posters 




Figure 3.2 Attitudes towards immigration. Source: Eurobarometer 
 
Yet, all is not well. In 2012, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
worried that in Ireland ‘official statistics to not reflect correctly the reality of the number of 
racially motivated offences’ (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 2013: 
12). An Garda Síochána is criticised for the hostility of some police towards ethnic 
minorities, for requiring independent verification beyond the statement of the victim that a 
crime had a racial colour, and for not recording racist incidents that fall short of a crime 
(Michael 2018). In 2017, the Irish state made no return of hate crime data to the annual call 
from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for 
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Security and Co-operation in Europe (O’Curry 2018). The Irish state has repeatedly failed to 
accept the obligations of international best practice. Following the 2001 Durban Declaration 
of the UN World Conference Against Racism, the Irish state instigated a National Plan 
Against Racism (2005-8) but this was not renewed after it lapsed (European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance 2013: 7). In February 2017 the government published its 
Migration Integration Strategy, which the primary NGO monitoring racism in Ireland found 
to ‘fall far short of the meeting the standards of a UN Durban Declaration-compliant National 
Action Plan Against Racism (O’Curry 2018). Of the 31 local authorities in the Republic, only 
ten had adopted such a strategy by April 2018 (Plunkett 2018). This is far from the only case 
where Ireland fails to adopt international best practice. 
In 1992 the Council of Europe promulgated the Convention on the Participation of 
Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level. Of the 47 member states, thirteen have signed and 
nine of these have ratified the Treaty (Council of Europe 2018a). Ireland is not one. Likewise 
the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, signed by 33 countries, and 
ratified by 25 of them. Ireland has done neither (Council of Europe 2018b). And the 
European Convention on Nationality of 1997, which counters statelessness and also 
discrimination on grounds of race, gender or ethnicity, signed by 29 and ratified by 21 of the 
signatories, is also avoided by the Republic of Ireland (Council of Europe 2018c). Likewise, 
the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, concerning the criminalisation of 
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, which was 
ratified by 23 of the 47 members of the Council of Europe, and signed alone by a further 10, 
but not by the Republic of Ireland (Council of Europe 2018d). Ireland and the United 
Kingdom have significant opt-in powers with respect to elements of EU law relating to 
freedom, security and justice and these have been increasingly exercised to amount to an 
abdication from directives on refugees and asylum seekers (El-Enany 2017, see also Chapter 
5 below). This includes the European Union Directive of 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, which allows anyone granted a right of residence the privilege of having their 
spouse and dependent children join them. This includes those qualifying as refugees, but not 
in Ireland. Ireland has now agreed to allow a limited number (530) of such family members 
to join refugees as part of its opt-in of accepting 4,000 migrants as part of the EU directives 
for accepting shares in the 160,000 refugees to be relocated out of Italy and Greece 
(Department of Justice and Equality 2017). 
In some of these matters, the Republic of Ireland has blindly followed the United 
Kingdom and thereby prevented the creation of an awkward disjuncture along its immediate 
borders, but in other respects it has introduced discriminations of its own. In 1999 there were 
7,724 applications for asylum in Ireland prompting at least one responsible agency, the 
Eastern Health Board to claim that it could not meet its statutory obligation to house these 
people and causing the chairperson of that Board to insist that ‘misspending money on people 
who have no right to come and claim asylum in Ireland is wrong’ (Donohoe 1999), and 
caused the Minister for Justice, John O’Donoghue to assert that the numbers were ‘spiralling 
out of control’ (Hewson 2018: 7). Concern about asylum seekers was stoked even by 
politicians who admitted the anxiety was without foundation, as when one TD noted a 
‘concern, rightly or wrongly, amongst people who feel threatened by them and who feel they 
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are in competition with them for housing and jobs’ (Donohoe 1999). In fact, the Republic of 
Ireland generally issues more work permits to people from outside the European Economic 
Area than the number of asylum applications it receives, although 1999 marked a brief 
exception (see figure 3.3).3 At a macro-scale, then, Ireland has a continuing need for labour, 
and asylum applicants run well below that level. A skills-audit of asylum seekers might 
suggest that many might be immediately accepted on these grounds alone. Instead, their 
likely contribution to society is squandered during a lengthy process of review and appeal. 
 
Figure 3.3 Work Permits to persons from outside the European Economic Area and Asylum 




In 2001, and in response to public concerns stoked in this irresponsible manner, the state 
introduced Direct Provision so that conditions for refugees in Ireland would at least be no 
better than in the United Kingdom or in the several other European countries that had already 
adopted similar systems. From the late 1990s the UK has adopted as normal practice, policies 
that had previously been invoked only as responses to acute crises, dispersing asylum seekers 
to locations not of their own choosing and, from 2000, detaining in ‘removal centres’ those 
appealing orders for deportation (Bloch and Schuster 2005). The crisis is normalised and the 
exception is installed as the rule. In following the UK, Ireland sought to dissuade refugees by 
making Ireland seem a hostile environment. Under Direct Provision, people seeking asylum 
in Ireland would be held in distinct accommodation that provided them with meals and where 
they would be subject to something like a curfew. Although mitigated in 2018, for much of 
the time since its inception the policy also prevented asylum seekers from taking up any paid 
employment (Breen 2008). When ‘Direct Provision was introduced in 2000 it was envisaged 
that protection applicants would live in Direct Provision accommodation centres on a short-
term basis of not more than six months while their applications were being processed’ 
(McMahon 2015: 14), in fact, the most recent figures, for June 2018, report a median stay of 
21 months (Reception and Integration Agency 2018: 18). The accumulation of people in 
Direct Provision (see figure 3.4) means that it generally exceeds the number of people held in 




Figure 3.4 People in Direct Provision Centres (January 2001 to June 2018), prisoners in 
custody (2000-15), prisoners in custody and under sentence (2007-17). Source: see endnotes 
 
A few years after the anxiety over refugees that introduced the Direct Provision system, 
there was renewed focus upon immigrants. In March 2004, Minister for Justice, Michael 
McDowell proposed a referendum on an amendment to the Constitution whereby children 
born in Ireland would not automatically acquire Irish citizenship. In this way Ireland could 
prevent ‘citizenship tourism’ (Beesley 2004a) which, insisted McDowell, was placing great 
pressure on Dublin’s maternity hospitals because ‘non-national parents […] perceive an 
advantage by giving birth in Ireland’ (McDowell 2004). McDowell ‘said that at one point last 
year, 576 non-national mothers presented at the Rotunda Hospital in Dublin within 10 days of 
delivery’ (Robinson 2004). McDowell was soon forced to concede that the managers of the 
hospitals had not begged him to act against ‘citizenship tourism’, and in response to questions 
in the Dáil he further conceded that of the 22,985 births in the three Dublin maternity 
hospitals, it was known that for the largest two of these hospitals there were only 442 births 
to non-EU nationals (Brennock 2004). As Mary Raftery (2004) quickly noted, the vast 
majority of these foreign mothers were ‘living and working in Ireland entirely legally,’ and 
thus had no need to give birth in order to make a claim to remain. Nevertheless, the lack of 
resources in the health sector could be blamed upon immigrants, and in the period leading up 
to the referendum, immigrants were also scapegoated for introducing HIV into Ireland’s 
maternity hospitals (Beesley 2004b). The referendum was passed with a massive majority 
(Yes 79%, No 21%, turnout 60%). 
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Direct Provision, then, was justified as deterring asylum applications in the context of 
shortages of jobs and housing, and the revocation of jus soli in the Constitution was justified 
as deterring immigration in the context of shortages within the health service. Associating 
refugees and immigrants with resource crises in the state may fuel racism and in producing 
this identification oils the election of racist politicians. Thus Donald Trump launched his 
presidential bid with a speech about Mexican immigrants as ‘criminals and rapists,’ and later 
castigated the majority of immigrants as coming from ‘shithole’ countries, rather than being 
of the more desirable stock of places like Norway (Leonhardt 2018). In the United Kingdom 
a former Foreign Minister has courted popular opinion with racist taunts about women in the 
burqa suggesting that it was ‘absolutely ridiculous that people should choose to go around 
looking like letter boxes’ (Johnson 2018). 
This is no time for complacency and in this respect the isolation imposed as part of 
Direct Provision is particularly dangerous. The UN Secretary-General advised that ‘[g]iven 
the overwhelming evidence that personal contact significantly reduces prejudice, more 
creative ways of fostering contacts between host communities on the one hand and refugees 
and migrants on the other are urgently needed’ (Ki-moon 2016: 11; Gill 2018). There are 
certainly examples where Irish people have reached out to their neighbours who are asylum 
seekers (Deegan 2018), but the whole purpose and design of Direct Provision restricts this 
(Nedeljković 2018a). In most cases, families are accommodated in a single room although 
this is not mandated and at times two families have shared the same bedroom, while 
unaccompanied adults are almost all in multi-occupancy rooms (McMahon 2015: 152). In 
2014, 3,385 persons were accommodated in twenty-five commercially-owned centres at a 
cost of €43.684m, or €11,390 per bed-space per year, while a further 1,150 were in seven 
centres owned by the state, at a cost of €6,000 per bed-space (McMahon 2015: 153). The 
accommodation is ‘cramped and very cluttered,’ and in almost all cases has no living space 
for family life beyond the bedroom itself (McMahon 2015: 162). Families have no secure 
space for storing private papers or even for medicines that may be toxic to children 
(McMahon 2015: 163). With no opportunity to prepare meals or to eat privately as a family, 
‘the living conditions are a substantial impediment to family life and parenting’ (McMahon 
2015: 165). 
Wishing to ‘avoid undue pressure on health and education services in specific major 
conurbations,’ the government has adopted an explicit dispersal policy ((McMahon 2015: 
176, see figure 3.5).5 In Nedeljković’s (2018b) compendium of Direct Provision centres, 
there is a striking map of all the centres that at one time or another were open in the city of 
Dublin, and now (June 2018) there are only two (Reception and Integration Agency 2018) 
and a city with some 24.6% of the country’s population (Central Statistics Office 2016) 
houses but 8.6% of the asylum seekers in Direct Provision. Some centres are in rural settings 
quite distant from a town and poorly served by bus services that in any case would be a 
significant expense for people on €21.60 per week. The McMahon Report gave the examples 
of ‘Mount Trenchard (8.5 km from Foynes and 42 km from Limerick City; and Millstreet 
(2.8 km from Millstreet and 48 km from Cork City)’ and noted that ‘such locations can act as 
a barrier to residents’ participation in activities in the area and access to legal, medical and 
other supports’ (McMahon 2015: 174). For children, this keeps them apart from after-hours 
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school-based or social activities. The requirement to take meals at the times set by the 
institution also limits engagement with activities outside the facility itself. One resident of the 
facility at Mosney complained that: ‘Everything is scheduled and controlled’ (Devine 2017). 
The security imposed on some of the centres is disproportionate, adding to a ‘sense of 
isolation’ and making residents permanently ‘feel that they are under surveillance as they go 
about their daily lives’ (McMahon 2015: 177). Fenced off from the community, children at 
one facility said that they ‘[d]on’t like to be called refugees,’ and felt ‘stigmatised because of 
where they live (Department of Justice and Equality 2017b: 6, 8). This is perhaps where the 
distinction between human security and state security threatens to come undone, along with 
the progressive potential identified by Morrissey in Chapter 1 above. Insofar as the 
discussion of asylum invokes notions of security, these are far more likely to be the 
protection of the host society against the potential terrorist threat or evident economic 
demands from the refugees. 
 
Figure 3.5 Residents in Direct Provisions Centres, June 2004 and June 2018. Source: 
Monthly Reports of the Reception and Integration Agency 
 
Corralling refugees in securitised spaces limits their integration into wider society, but is 
also complicit with a broader security concern that bedevils immigrants and asylum seekers. 
Already in 1997 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1998) spoke of human 
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security as a context for considering the treatment of refugees and in doing so shifted the 
focus away from the rights of the refugees, towards the impact that their relocation would 
have on host economies and societies (Adelman 2001; Paris 2001). In this respect it is not the 
safety of refugees but rather the security of the places where they take refuge that is 
paramount, and immediately the notion of ‘shield[ing] [vulnerable] people from menaces’ 
(Commission on Human Security 2003: 10; as discussed by Morrissey in Chapter 1 above) is 
undone. This statist security turn in UN practice was only confirmed after 9/11 (MacFarlane 
and Khong 2006). The progressive Durban Declaration that came from the World Conference 
against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was 
promulgated on 8 September 2001. Only three days later the al-Qaeda attacks on the United 
States reclaimed international attention for terrorism. People displaced from places of conflict 
were now tainted with a suspicion of terrorism (Tirman 2004). Less than a month after the 
attacks on the US, the British Prime Minister promised legislation that would ‘increase our 
ability to exclude and remove those whom we suspect of terrorism and who are seeking to 
abuse our asylum procedures’ (Hansard 2001). This identifies asylum seekers as the source of 
terrorism. On 14 September 2001, the FBI had named the nineteen al-Qaeda hijackers and 
none were asylum seekers (Federal Bureau of Intelligence 2001).  
When the Irish Senate discussed the Mediterranean refugee crisis in 2015, one senator 
worried about ‘terrorists infiltrating the ranks of refugees being a problem for Europe and 
elsewhere in the future? Obviously, if that situation comes to pass, then public opinion will 
change dramatically’ (Dáil 2015). These vocal concerns may actually feed public anxiety, 
and in January 2016 a poll found 59% worried that terrorists could enter Ireland under the 
guise of refugees (Corcoran 2016). Although Estrada-Tanck (2016), among others, has 
insisted that the individual focus of the Human Security perspective can counter the state-
security focus of much current refugee policy, I worry that security discourses are 
irredeemably statist in public debate and risk disqualifying the claims of others in favour of 
our own largely unwarranted fears (Lynn and Lea 2003). Certainly, its place within Irish 
public debate would feed such a worry. The challenge is to find ways that a focus upon the 
needs of the most vulnerable might be prioritised in a fashion more akin to the hopes that 
attended the initial formulation of the notion of Human Security in contradistinction to State 
Security. The politics of fear need to be devalued and more generous ways of conceptualising 
the rights of others developed. In the remainder of this essay I want to sketch some ways this 
might be attempted through a discussion of the limits of crisis as a way of framing the issues 
attending refugees and through an expanded notion of reparations that might be cultivated, in 
the case of Ireland at least, through a fuller explication of the historical context of the debate 
over reparations as a basis for migration policy. 
 
Reparations and the historical context of crisis 
 
The notion of crisis makes it difficult to comprehend the context of refugees and the claims 
they can make upon us. The current refugee crisis for Europe has two main components, 
Syrian and Libyan, and both are consequences in some respect of the Arab Spring and the 
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temporary political realignments it allowed. But this immediate geopolitical context leaves in 
shadow longer-term relations.  
When Western nations encouraged political instability in Libya with the avowed aim of 
removing Muammar Gaddafi from power, the Libyan ruler responded by threatening to 
unleash a migration crisis upon Europe: ‘If you threaten [Libya], if you seek to destabilize us, 
there will be chaos, Bin Laden, armed factions. […] You will have immigration, thousands of 
people will invade Europe from Libya. And there will no longer be anyone to stop them’ 
(Valdiguié 2001). Funded by oil revenues, Libya’s public works projects from the 1970s 
onwards drew into the country migrants from most of Africa north of the Sahara. From the 
middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century Gaddafi tried to prioritise immigration 
from Arab rather than African countries but there was already a significant African labour 
force in Libya (Almukhtar et al. 2015). Gaddafi used the African residents as weapons in 
foreign policy towards his Arab neighbours, threatening to send them across Libya’s borders 
as refugees (Paoletti 2011). Although represented as reparations for colonial crimes during 
Italy’s rule over Libya (1911-43), the 2008 Italy-Libya Friendship Treaty was another such 
use of migration as a weapon, with Gaddafi promising to retain African migrants in Libya in 
return for $5bn (Ronzitti 2009). In fact, rather than addressing the memory of the carceral 
geography of Italian occupation, the Treaty replicated it, placing African migrants in the 
same sort of camps for which Libyans now claimed reparations (De Cesari 2012). 
There was at least one other colonial power shaping these relations. In the 1890s, British 
colonial power moved up the White Nile annexing upstream territories in northern Uganda 
and southern Sudan and securing thereby the water with which to irrigate the Egyptian cotton 
fields that supplied the mills of Lancashire (Tvedt 2011). To obtain for Egypt the waters of 
the Blue Nile, the British signed a treaty with the Emperor of Ethiopia and others with 
colonial powers that controlled territory in the region (McKenzie 2012). These colonial 
treaties restricted the use of the Nile in most of the regions through which it flowed and 
limited development prospects in the region, provoking emigration to labour hubs like Libya. 
Today, regional cooperation is seeking to address these historical issues and the Nile Basin 
Initiative (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South 
Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda) is a hopeful development, producing as it has, an 
agreement to allow significant water exploitation upstream from Egypt with the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Yihdego 2017). Yet these legacies of colonialism are part of the 
historical context of the current crisis and they may lay claims upon parties outside the 
region, claims that the sense of crisis occludes. Multilateral agencies, such as the United 
Nations, have given increasing attention to such claims and in the course of doing so have 
made a case for reparations. 
Sponsored by the United Nations (UN), the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance was held in South Africa in 2001 and, 
with the exception of the US and Israel who left the Conference early, the participants 
endorsed what is now known as the Durban Declaration. The Declaration affirmed that 
‘slavery and the slave trade are a crime against humanity and should always have been so, 
especially the transatlantic slave trade and are among the major sources and manifestations of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,’ and that ‘colonialism has 
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led to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, and that Africans and 
people of African descent, and people of Asian descent and indigenous peoples were victims 
of colonialism and continue to be victims of its consequences’ (United Nations 2001: 6, 7). 
Racism and continuing disadvantage are evident sequelae of colonialism and slavery. The 
Declaration commended those states that, in face of evident complicity in slavery and in 
recognition of the continuing harm resulting, ‘have taken the initiative to apologize and have 
paid reparation, where appropriate, for grave and massive violations committed’ (United 
Nations 2001: 17). The Durban Declaration and, in 2007, the bicentenary of the British Act 
for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, provoked a broader discussion of reparations in the 
Caribbean (Shepherd 2008). In 2013 CARICOM detailed the reparations that Caribbean 
states demand of the European slave-owning states and promised to develop a legal case to 
obtain them (Caribbean Community Reparations Commission 2013). The states of former 
slave-owners are hailed: ‘This 21st Century will be the century in which the world will be 
called upon to atone with reparatory justice for the crimes against Africans and their 
descendants’ (Beckles 2014: 12). 
European states have been reluctant to accept this obligation, arguing: that slavery was 
legal at the time of its practice; that culpable parties are long since dead; and that slavery was 
too far in the past to cause any current injustice. Yet, in response it might be argued: that the 
argument that slavery is a crime against humanity rests upon an appeal to natural law rather 
than to contemporary legislation, that the liabilities of states (like their debts) are generally 
understood as multi-generational, and, finally, that, long after the end of formal slavery, the 
states of former slave owners continued to exploit the people of the Caribbean, as well as of 
other regions from which slaves were taken or to which they were brought, perpetuating the 
earlier and unjust racialised exploitation (Beckles 2014). In other words, the relations 
between Europe and Africa, between Europe and the Caribbean have an asymmetry that is a 
colonial legacy, a legacy of slavery.  
Following Iris Marion Young’s discussion of structural injustice, Maeve McKeown 
distinguishes between liability and social connection (Young 2006; McKeown 2015). If 
liability is reparations based on distinct harms inflicted or ill-gotten gains retained, then, 
social connection is a somewhat looser basis for a claim, proposing that all parties to a 
historic injustice should seek to repair its continuing harms. This is what CARICOM terms 
reparatory justice (Caribbean Community Reparations Commission 2013). This weaker 
notion of responsibility is one that more easily implicates European people in a reparations 
claim, one that could comprehend rights of residence as ways of meeting such claims. In 
other words, if slavery produced continuing harms, countries that were parties to slavery 
might feel they owe a debt to inhabitants of places where these harms are still felt. Allowing 
immigration from places still injured by the pathologies of post-slavery might be one way to 
give a benefit that could redress those harms. 
When it considers its global responsibilities, the Republic of Ireland has tended to 
position itself among the ex-colonies rather than the ex-colonials (Connolly 1999).. It has 
seen its relations with Africa and the Caribbean as based on solidarity (Guelke 2000) rather 
than responsibility. This may broadly be fair but perhaps the situation is a little more 
complex. Certainly many Irish-born people were prominent as traders, administrators, or 
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soldiers, throughout the British Empire (Cleary 2007). And while the Irish state is too young 
to have properly acquired a direct liability for slavery, there might yet be grounds for 
speaking of a responsibility based on social connection. In this next section I show some of 
these social connections highlighting the engagement of some Irish people in exploiting 
slaves and in fiercely defending slavery, while others vigorously opposed slavery and went so 
far as to propose an anticolonial solidarity between slaves and the great mass of Irish 
subjects. 
 
Ireland and Reparations for Slavery 
 
When slavery was declared abolished throughout the British Empire in 1833, there remained 
some 800,000 slaves in the Caribbean. The slave-owners requested compensation and 
Parliament (including the slave-owners who sat there) voted them a sum of twenty million 
pounds. In addition, slaves were required to give four to six years free labour at forty-five 
hours per week. Draper (2010) estimates that the slave-owners were effectively compensated 
for between 75% and over 90% of the value of their slaves, about half from the British 
taxpayers and half by the continued coerced labour of their former slaves. The 
Commissioners of Slave Compensation made some 45,000 individual awards and the 
Legacies of British Slave-ownership Project has determined a home residence for the 
majority of these.6 Although many individuals involved in slave-ownership spent parts of 
their lives in different locations within the British Empire, the snapshot of ownership at the 
moment of abolition found some living in Britain or Ireland, absentee owners of their 
Caribbean slaves. Of the 45,000 beneficiaries, some 3,000 were absentee owners living in 
Britain or Ireland, but these owned about half the total number of slaves. Of the 6,000 awards 
made to these absentee owners, only 170 were made to owners resident in Ireland. 
Nevertheless, this represented the ownership of 14,752 slaves; and of course there were Irish 
people living in Britain and owning slaves, in addition to the Irish people actually in the 




Figure 3.6 The number of Caribbean slaves for whom compensation was paid under the 
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Abolition of Slavery Act (1833), by residence of owner. Source: Legacy of British Slave-
ownership Project 
 
Mapping the number of slaves owned by residence of the absentee owners living in 
Ireland, shows some of the colonial ties between Irish people and the Caribbean (see figure 
3.6). The 3,149 people mapped for the City of Dublin represent the slaves of seventeen 
absentee owners. The town of Larne had just two absentee slave-owners but Charles McGarel 
was compensated for the loss of 2,777 slaves and John McGarel for 448; a significant 
element of the local economy, perhaps, since the population of Larne (New Town, Old Town 
and Parish) was only 3,182 in 1831 (British Parliamentary Papers 1833). Indeed Charles 
McGarel endowed his hometown with almshouses, a cemetery and a town hall (Draper 2013: 
238). Draper (2013: 237) speculates that the lack of mercantile wealth in Ireland limited 
investment in slaves and estimates that whereas perhaps between five and ten per cent of 
Britain’s elites were compensated in consequence of the end of slavery in the Caribbean, for 
Ireland the comparable figure might have been between two and three per cent.  
The colonial nature of the Irish elites is evident even among the small sample that 
features as absentee slave-owners. Let one stand for many. In about 1690, the Batty family 
moved from England to Ballyhealy, Westmeath. In 1788 Philip Batty was High Sheriff of 
Westmeath (Lyons 1853), and in 1797 he was on the Grand Jury of Westmeath that voted a 
service of silver plate to the officer commanding a militia that, in suppressing the insurgent 
United Irishmen, summarily executed some of the makers of pikes, while also torching forty 
houses in the village of Moyvore as collective punishment (Woods 1907: 33, 27). Of his six 
children, one became a Church of Ireland vicar, and two of his sons were owners of Jamaican 
slaves at the time of compensation claims: Fitzherbert (1792-1847) had qualified from 
Lincoln’s Inn in 1817, moving to Jamaica soon after and at abolition, owned 461 slaves on 
four Jamaican estates, and he himself lived on the island; and Espine (1794-1883) was 
compensated for 481 Jamaican slaves on two estates while he himself was living in Stephen’s 
Green in Dublin (Legacies of British Slave-ownership Project 2018). Espine had been called 
to the Irish Bar in 1819 and was counsel to the General Post Office in Ireland by 1843 
(Dublin Almanac 1835: 153; Post Office Directory 1843: 151). Heavily engaged with the 
Protestant hegemony in Jamaica, both in the law and in the militia, in 1832 Fitzherbert had 
been appointed acting Attorney General in Jamaica (de Jong 2017: 189-90), but some time 
after the manumission of the slaves and after himself having been certified insane in 1839  
(Legacies of British Slave-ownership Project 2018), he returned to Ireland where his 
fathering of illegitimate children around his lands in Westmeath began to drain the family 
fortunes (Norton 2002). The eccentricities may be individual but the intermingling of 
economic privilege and colonial authority is typical. 
The slave economy of the Black Atlantic brought plantation goods to Ireland and was in 
turn a significant market for Irish pickled and salted goods (Rodgers 2007). The slave-
owning colonies attracted many Irish people with even modest capital to invest in the 
plantations, while yet others, political or economic exiles, went as indentured labour, 
particularly in the seventeenth century (Block and Shaw 2011). These threads pulled Ireland 
into the political economy of colonialism in complex ways and invite nuanced reflection 
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upon the social connections between Ireland and slavery. Certainly slavery in the Caribbean 
relied upon colonial relations, and slave labour made colonialism profitable. Slave rebellions 
were defeated by force of troops from Europe, and the slaves of the French colony of Saint 
Domingue only threw off their slave masters after they had defeated, in various combinations 
during the period 1791-1804, the military of France, Spain and Britain (Blackburn 1988). 
When slave-owners in Jamaica objected to abolition on the grounds that they could easily 
have sustained the system if left to themselves, the Governor of Jamaica, Howe Peter Browne 
(1788-1845), the Marquis of Sligo, and himself compensated for 286 Jamaican slaves, was 
fierce in reminding them of the ‘fostering attention’ of their ‘mother country’: ‘within the last 
three years, you have received three hundred thousand pounds as a loan to individuals who 
suffered in the late rebellion,’ and ‘[t]hat the parent state took upon herself the whole 
payment of the troops for the two years subsequent to that rebellion’ (Madden 1835: 190). 
In some respects, the common experience of colonialism can foster bonds of solidarity 
between Irish people and slaves or people were formerly enslaved. The influence moves in 
both directions. Roger Casement (1864-1916) claimed that he was brought to a heightened 
sense of the systemic nature of the violence put upon the bodies of rubber tappers in Congo, 
because he was ‘looking at this tragedy with the eyes of another race – of a people once 
hunted themselves,’7 for ‘his Irish environment, then, […] made it natural for Casement to 
see the world in terms of a general struggle against colonialism’ (Ranger 1966: 24). In other 
cases, experiences in the colonies made an individual more radical in their understanding of 
Ireland’s colonial subjugation. It was Daniel O’Connell (1775-1847) who called for the 
collation and publication of the amounts and names for the compensation paid to slave-
owners (Draper 2010: 4; British Parliamentary Papers 1837-8).8 This was a payment that he 
had continually opposed because the property in question was always an immoral one and 
‘no man could reasonably claim compensation for surrendering that which inflicted wrong 
upon his fellow creature’ (Hansard 1832). 
When the abolition of slavery was proposed the slave-owners protested and from the 
Assemblies of their various slave islands sent up to the Imperial Parliament amendments to at 
once both nullify and compensate. In consequence, the twenty million were voted and the 
period of apprenticeship instituted. The British parliament intended that corporal punishment 
on the plantations would cease and it sent thirty stipendiary magistrates out to the Caribbean 
to provide a legal system for the judgement and punishment of the ‘apprentices’. One of these 
was an Irish-born Catholic, Richard Madden (1798-1888), who left after a year, in fear of his 
life from the planters (Murray 1972). Based in Jamaica, Madden encountered another 
Irishman, Fitzherbert Batty, the slaveowner who had been for a time acting Attorney General 
for Jamaica (1832), ‘a distinguished colonial lawyer, who has taken an active part in farming 
new Abolition Acts to amend the original one’ (Madden 1835: 181). Batty acted as legal 
counsel to his fellow slave-owners bending the law towards themselves in ways by turns 
vexatious and cruel. The young children of former slaves were not to be impressed into 
apprenticeship but instead to grow up free, unless, interposed Batty, there were grounds to 
anticipate their not being of secure economic standing, and which former slave could give 
satisfactory proof of economic independence. ‘Apprentices’ were not to be punished by their 
masters, but if the masters were accused of cruelty these cases, insisted Batty, would be heard 
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by local juries, of other masters. Apprentices could purchase their freedom, but, suggested 
Batty, not if they had been reliably accused of crimes, and, as Madden noted, the ‘charge of 
theft […] so easily brought’ nullified the provision (Madden 1835: 187). Madden insisted 
that the former-slaves would get no justice from the Jamaican Assembly given its ‘evident 
[…] complexion’ (Madden 1835: 192). Time and again, Madden encountered Irish people 
administering or defending some of the worst horrors of slavery, commenting in a work on 
slavery in Cuba: ‘The Irish alas I have invariably found, who are employed in any shape, are 
advocates for slavery in all its horrors’ (Murray 1972: 52). 
Madden threw himself into the cause of abolition throughout the 1830s and thereafter 
began a multi-volume historical work on the United Irishmen and their rebellion of 1798. He 
was led from the one to the other, remarking that working to repress slavery was ‘an 
apprenticeship to the cause of general freedom,’ and ‘having long devoted heart and hand to 
the cause of justice and humanity in the West Indies and in Africa, I felt it impossible to get 
rid of the conviction that the outrages committed in Ireland, particularly during the last 
rebellion, had never been surpassed in any country.’9 From a common experience of colonial 
oppression might come a sense of solidarity. However, both in Ireland and in the diaspora 
this solidarity has often been wanting. Despite Daniel O’Connell’s call for the Irish in the 
United States to ‘cling’ to the abolitionists, for slavery, he insisted, was ‘a sin against God 
and man,’ in fact, the Irish in America very often had a sense of racial distinction that fed 
either a precarious sense of superiority over, or, at best, a radically separate interest from, 
their enslaved African-American neighbours (Gleeson 2016: 623). Ireland, itself, showed 
American abolitionists ‘an ambiguous peripheral space with a complex relationship to slavery 
and empire,’ and yet, fugitive slaves and former slaves met starving Irish people with at least 
an ‘implicit acknowledgment’ that the Irish body was ‘constituted as an instance of sovereign 
failure and violently extirpated political subjectivity’ (Sweeney 2016: 509, 506). 
This ambivalence of the Irish location with respect to colonialism has been expressed in 
various ways. Richard Kearney (1985) described Irish thought as given to a sort of double 
consciousness, a dialectical both/and. To capture the effects of the staged removal of colonial 
apparatuses, Howes and Attridge write of a semicolonial Ireland (Howes and Attridge 2000). 
On the social connection model, an argument could be made that Irish people were 
implicated in the reproduction of slavery and racism worldwide, and, thus were among the 
‘agents who contribute by their actions to the structural processes that produce injustice [and 
thus] have responsibilities to work to remedy these injustices’ (Young 2006: 203). Beyond 
that, there is a social solidarity model that could be fed empathetically by reflecting upon a 
common experience of colonialism and its longer-term effects. This might encourage Irish 
people to think that their relative comfort allows them to extend hospitality to other people 




Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention defined a refugee as a person who is unable or 
unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being 
‘persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
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or political opinion’ (United Nations 1951). Signatories promised to receive such persons 
should they apply for asylum. The notion of ‘particular social group’ is increasingly given 
wider ambit, and, for example, asylum justified in cases where women would be at risk of 
rape for their ethnicity or political belief, or where young women would be at risk of 
involuntary infibulation should they be returned (Anker 2002). With new social groups 
accepted as refugees the forms of persecution in question will also multiply. In 1969 the 
Organisation of African Unity broadened their definition of refugee, and in 1984 a group of 
Latin American countries likewise extended theirs to include those whose ‘lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed 
public order’ (Ki-moon 2016: 5). Rather than being individually targeted, these more 
generously designate certain countries as so toxic that people might need refuge outside 
them.  
Were it not so expedient for politicians to repeatedly cultivate these fears, spreading the 
notion of refugees in this way might perhaps weaken the fear of refugees as likely terrorists. 
For example, some people advocate the recognition of environmental or climate refugees 
(Williams 2008). With rising sea levels, most atolls (Storlazzi et al. 2018), and many coastal 
cities may be drowned (Holder et al. 2017). There will certainly be extensive adjustments and 
population movements will be part of that. Regional compacts to address these social and 
economic challenges would certainly be welcome yet we should approach the extension of 
refugee policy with caution. First, most of the population movement will probably not render 
people stateless (McAdam 2011), and it will be the poorer districts and low-wage factories of 
other cities within each country that are likely to fill up with displaced persons, at least if the 
experience after recent cyclones is any guide (Lu et al. 2016). Secondly, there is a Malthusian 
understanding of climate conflict and climate refugees in which the failure of certain societies 
to manage their environmental relations invites the intervention of richer countries to tamp 
down regional unrest. Betsy Hartmann (2010: 242) is surely right to warn against framing the 
problem in ways that might further ‘militarise not only climate policy, but also development 
aid.’ 
The notion of refugee is so toxic that we must supplement it with the broader notion of 
displaced persons. We could even return to the notion of reparations and ask how Ireland 
might be part of the social connections that has produced the climate change that makes 
livelihoods more precarious in other places. In this respect, it is shaming that Ireland has such 
ineffective policies to control greenhouse gas emissions (Halpin 2017). Addressing the issue 
of displacement from the perspective of climate change (Keane 2003), we might argue that 
Ireland has an above average responsibility. In this context, we could even propose that work 
permits would be a form of international aid, or of global carbon reparations. Just as with the 
racialised migrations that are the sequelae of colonialism and slavery, so there will be new 
obligations that flow from the political ecology of our current industrialised societies and 
Ireland should acknowledge its share. Reparations and their historical justification may 
provide a way to think more generously about the grounds for welcoming asylum seekers 
into our safe European home. In our postcolonial (and hopefully soon post-carbon) world the 
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historical legacies that demand reparations should give us pause before we invoke state 
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